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CHAPTER V
LAND FORCES
One can speak with some assurance regarding many of the
problems of jurisdiction over warships and their crews, on the
basis of the opinion of writers, court decisions and the practice
of states. As to land forces, however, in the absence of an agree-
ment as to their status there is a paucity of precedent upon which
firm conclusions regarding jurisdiction over such forces can be
based.
The United States Government in 1943 formally took the posi-
tion that a rule of international law "recognizes the immunity
from local jurisdiction in criminal matters of members of the
armed forces of a foreign sovereign on the territory by permis-
sion or with the consent of the local sovereign. ,, x The same posi-
tion was taken by Colonel Archibald King in an article which did
much to shape American attitudes toward the status of forces
problem.2 The Department of Justice, the Department of State
and the Department of Defense have since taken the reverse posi-
tion. 3 The latter position has the support of other commentators,
1 Memorandum submitted by the United States to the Canadian Govern-
ment in the "Reference Re Exemption of United States Forces from
Canadian Criminal Law" [1943], 4 D.L.R. 11, at 405 of the Memorandum.
The Memorandum, and the "Factum of the Attorney General of Canada"
submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada in the Reference, are both re-
printed in Hearings on H.J. Res. 309 Before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 404 (July 13, 14, 19-21, 26, 1955).
2 King, "Jurisdiction over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces," 36 A.J.I.L.
539 (1942).
8 See the statement of the Attorney General, submitted to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in the hearing on the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement and reprinted in 99 Cong. Rec. 8762 (1953). Assistant Attorney
General Rankin said of this statement: "We examined every authority we
could find. We examined the original text, the French, the Italian, and all
of the various law, body of law, of the countries involved in the NATO
agreements, and I then reviewed it all and we came to the conclusion * * *
that Colonel King's position could not be maintained, either under the
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notably Dr. G. P. Barton in an outstanding series of articles. 4 It
is worthwhile to inquire into the basis for the stand taken in
1943, and for the reversal of that position.
All discussion of the issue begins with the opinion of Chief
Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange* The opinion, it
should be noted, is first and foremost an affirmation of the pri-
macy of territorial jurisdiction. Its major premise is that "the
jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily
exclusive and absolute * * *", and that all exceptions to its "full
and complete power * * * must be traced up to the consent of the
nation itself." 6 However, in view of the "perfect equality and
absolute independence of sovereigns," territorial jurisdiction
"would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns, nor their
sovereign rights, as its object." Hence sovereigns and ambassa-
dors are accorded immunity, and
"A third case in which a sovereign is understood to cede
a portion of his territorial jurisdiction is where he allows
the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions.
decisions or under the practice * * *." Hearings, H.J. Res. 309, supra, note
1, at 343.
A memorandum of the State Department stated: "NATO military per-
sonnel are not immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the United States
or of the several states. It is the position of the United States that there
is no such immunity under international law." Hearings on Status of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Armed Forces and Military Head-
quarters before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 83rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1953).
4 Barton, "Foreign Armed Forces : Immunity from Supervisory Jurisdic-
tion," 1949 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 380; Barton, "Foreign Armed Forces: Im-
munity from Criminal Jurisdiction," 1950 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 186; Barton,
"Foreign Armed Forces: Qualified Jurisdictional Immunity," 1954 Brit.
Yb. Int'l L. 341.
6 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
6 "It is clear from the language of that decision that the governing, basic,
principle is not the immunity of the foreign state but the full jurisdiction of
the territorial state and that any immunity of the foreign state must be
traced to a waiver—express or implied—of its jurisdiction on the part of the
territorial state. Any derogation from that jurisdiction is an impairment of
the sovereignty of the territorial state and must not readily be assumed."
Lauterpacht, "The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States,"
1951 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 220, 229. The Supreme Court, in Wilson v. Girard,
354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957), cited The Schooner Exchange as authority for the
statement that "A sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish
offenses against its law committed within its borders, unless it expressly or
impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction."
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"In such case, without any express declaration waiving
jurisdiction over the army to which this right of passage has
been granted, the sovereign who should attempt to exercise it,
would certainly be considered as violating his faith. By ex-
ercising it, the purpose for which the free passage was
granted would be defeated and a portion of the military force
of a foreign independent nation would be diverted from those
national objects and duties to which it was applicable, and
would be withdrawn from the control of the sovereign whose
power and whose safety might greatly depend on retaining
the exclusive command and disposition of this force. The
grant of a free passage, therefore, implies a waiver of all
jurisdiction over the troops, during their passage, and per-
mits the foreign general to use that discipline and to inflict
those punishments which the government of his army may
require." 7
Marshall cited neither authority nor precedent for his observa-
tion regarding jurisdiction over foreign armed forces; there was
little he could have cited. 8 Text writers in the intervening years
prior to World War II based their comments largely on Marshall's
opinion
;
9 for other than treaty arrangements in World War I,10
there was little else on which they could have been based.
7 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812).
8 Hall states that "Either from oversight, or, as perhaps is more probable,
because the exercise of exclusive control by military and naval officers not
only over the internal economy of the forces under their command, but
over them as against external jurisdiction, was formerly too much taken for
granted to be worth mentioning, the older writers on international law
rarely give any attention to the matter." Hall, 1 International Law 237-38
(8th ed. 1934). He cites Casaregis and Lampridi as having taken opposing
positions on the matter.
9 Wheaton's comment (1 Inter. Law 234 (6th ed. 1929).) is virtually a
quotation from Marshall's opinion, as is that of Wildman, 1 Institutes of
Inter. Law 66 (1849).
10 United States v. Thierichens, 243 Fed. 419 (D.C., E.D., Pa., 1917)
held subject to American jurisdiction the commander of the German cruiser
Prinz Eitel Friedrich, interned in Philadelphia, for smuggling and violation
of the Mann Act.
The Military Court of Rome held, in In re Polimeni [1935-1937] Ann. Dig.
248 (No. 101), that Italy had jurisdiction where a member of the Italian
armed forces in the Saar Territory, in connection with the plebiscite there,
assaulted a British corporal. The court said: "International law recognizes
the so-called fiction of extraterritoriality, which applies to troops passing
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THEORETICAL BASES FOR IMMUNITY
A. The Interests of the Sending State
Chief Justice Marshall's reference to the "perfect equality and
absolute independence of sovereigns" and to a sovereign's "dignity
and the dignity of his nation" can hardly be read to mean that
every instrumentality and every representative of a sovereign is,
when abroad, necessarily completely immune from local jurisdic-
tion. Marshall himself stated that
:
"The preceding reasoning has maintained the proposition
that all exemptions from territorial jurisdiction must be
derived from the consent of the sovereign of the territory;
that this consent may be implied or expressed; and that,
when implied, its extent must be regulated by the nature of
the case and the views under tvhich the parties requiring and
conceding it, must be supposed to act." 1X
Moreover, there are simply too many cases of public instru-
mentalities, e.g., public vessels engaged in commerce, and of rep-
resentatives of a sovereign, e.g., the lesser personnel of an
embassy, consuls, representatives to international organizations,
who admittedly do not enjoy complete immunity, to assert that
either the equality and independence of states or the respect due
to a sovereign requires complete immunity for every instru-
mentality or representative. An argument along these lines could,
with respect to visiting forces, be made on behalf of a commander
through or stationed in the territory of another State. This fiction is based
upon the undisputed principle that armies, the supreme expression of the
force upon which the sovereignty of a State is founded, carry their laws and
their judges with them. From this follows another principle, namely that
the members of the army which passes through or is stationed in foreign
territory cannot be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the territory, but
only to Italian military criminal jurisdiction, regardless of whether the
crime is one of military or of common law." This is, of course, dictum;
Italy undoubtedly had at least concurrent jurisdiction over the accused.
Compare In re Besednjak, Court of Assize, Trieste, Italy, Jan. 16, 1948,
[1948] Ann. Dig. 106 (No. 33), in which the court rejected a plea that the
accused were members of the Yugoslav armed forces. The court held that
Yugoslavia was not allied or associated with Italy in 1945, although it was
a co-belligerent, so Article 26 of the Italian Military Code in Time of War,
which provided that if an expeditionary force of an allied state was sta-
tioned in Italian territory, only authorities of the force could try members
of the force, was not applicable.
"U.S. (7Cranch) 116,143 (1812). (Emphasis added.)
83
but loses much of its force if advanced on behalf of every soldier,
sailor, marine, and airman. 12
The fundamental reason advanced by Marshall for his position
was that of military exigency; that, in brief, the immunity of
visiting forces rests on a functional basis. There is nothing in his
language suggesting the fiction of extraterritoriality and, given
the present standing of that fiction, one must discount the com-
ments of those writers who invoke it as the basis for their claim
that the immunity exists. 13
12 "It would appear from the reasoning of the Court, [in The Exchange],
that the basis of immunity in all cases was the same fundamental principle
that the absolute jurisdiction of one state does not envisage the sovereign
right of another state as its object. However satisfactory this principle may
be as a basis for sovereign and diplomatic immunity, there are strong rea-
sons of theory and practice for seeking a more solid principle on which to
base the jurisdictional immunity of visiting forces." Barton, 1949 Brit. Yb.
Int'l L. 280, 411-12.
But compare Senator Dirksen, 99th Cong. Rec, 8773 (1953) : "Every
American citizen and every American soldier is a symbol of American
sovereignty when we send him abroad; and, unless we protect him, we
demean and degrade the very sovereignty he represents." See also Hall, op.
cit. supra, note 9, at 219: "The head of the state, its armed forces, and its
diplomatic agents are regarded as embodying or representing its sovereignty,
or in other words, its character of an equal and independent being. They
symbolize something to which deference and respect are due, and they are
consequently treated with deference and respect themselves." The Canadian
Attorney General referred to "that fundamental principle which requires
* * * that the dignity and independence of the foreign government con-
cerned be preserved entirely in this field of international relations." Ca-
nadian Factum, Hearings, H.J. Res. 309, supra, note 1, at 431. See also
Heyking, UExterritoriality, 156 (1889).
18
It is not always possible to determine whether a writer who refers to
extraterritoriality as the basis for the immunity of visiting forces is in
fact invoking the fiction or merely using the term as a summary of other
ideas or to describe a result.
Apparently Oppenheim should be included among the former (1 Lauter-
pacht-Oppenheim, International Law 853 (8th Ed. 1957) [cited at n. 1, ch.
IV]), as should Foelix, who wrote: "After having explained how vessels
navigating on the high seas form the continuation of the nation's territory,
we must concern ourselves with another fiction of the droit des gens, re-
lating to the person of the individual accused of a crime or offense. The
soldier under the flag or on active duty who finds himself in a foreign
country is considered as being in his country: in consequence, even though
he is in a friendly or neutral country, the crimes or offenses of which he is
culpable are punished as though they had been committed in his country."
2 Droit International Prive 263 (1866)
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Military exigency has been accepted by most writers as the con-
trolling factor in the situation. It has been the primary basis for
those who have reached the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the
sending state over visiting forces passing through or stationed in
a foreign state is exclusive 14—which may or may not have been
Marshall's view. Only a few writers have analyzed the situation
in depth and explained precisely what the factors of military
exigency are which require recognizing so extensive an im-
munity.
It should be beyond dispute that a military commander must be
able to maintain discipline over the forces under his command,
wherever they may be. If he lacked that power, taking an army
into foreign territory would be in effect to disband it. Stated
Twiss, who discussed the immunity of foreign forces and warships under
the heading: "Extra-Territoriality of certain Foreign Persons and Things,"
said in part: "A ship of war has been termed an expansion of the territory
of the Nation to which it belongs, not only when it is on the wide ocean
but when it is in a foreign port. In this respect the ship of war resembles
an army marching by consent through a neutral territory. Neither ships
of war nor army so licensed fall under the jurisdiction of a Foreign State."
Law of Nations, 271-272 (1884).
See also 1 Phillimore, Inter. Law 474 (3d ed. 1879) ; 1 Wharton, Inter.
Law Digest 43 (2d ed. 1887) ; Holland, Lectures on Intel-national Lav:,
148-149 (1933); 1 De Martens, Traite de Droit International, 449 (1883).
Taylor sets forth the fiction but attributes it to necessity and con-
venience, and in a subsequent comment says: "It may be stated as a
general rule that a foreign army passing over the territory of a friendly
state, whether as an ally in a common cause or not, is entirely exempt from
its civil and criminal jurisdiction, for the reason that any other rule would
be destructive of discipline. * * * If an exception to this general rule exists
it is in favor of the local jurisdiction over an offending member of the
force found entirely outside its line." International Public Law 230 (1901).
14 Among the writers who assert that the sending state has exclusive
jurisdiction over its forces, some support their conclusion only by reference
to the necessity that the commander of the visiting forces be able to main-
tain discipline, apparently assuming it to be self-evident that the maintenance
of discipline requires not only the right to exercise jurisdiction but that it
be exclusive. Others either expressly assert this to be true, or take the
position that military exigency requires the commander be able to main-
tain control, as distinguished from discipline, and that the maintenance of
control demands that the sending state's jurisdiction be exclusive. Some
refer to neither factor, but simply assert that military exigency requires
that the sending state have exclusive jurisdiction.
Hyde states that: "Strong grounds of convenience and necessity prevent
the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign organized military force which,
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another way, the sending state must have jurisdiction to prescribe
rules with respect to the members of its armed forces abroad. For
the great majority of the members of an armed force such juris-
diction could be based on nationality; however, this is not the
with the consent of the territorial sovereign, enters its domain. Members
of the force who there commit offenses are dealt with by the military or
other authorities of the State to whose service they belong, unless the
offenders are voluntarily given up." 1 Hyde, International Law 819 (2d ed.
rev. 1945).
Hall states that: "There can be no question that the concession of jurisdic-
tion over passing troops to the local authorities would be extremely in-
convenient; and it is believed that the commanders, not only of forces in
transit through a friendly country with which no convention exists, but also
of forces stationed there, assert exclusive jurisdiction in principle in re-
spect of offenses committed by persons under their command, though they
may be willing as a matter of concession to hand over culprits to the civil
power when they have confidence in the courts, and when their stay is
likely to be long enough to allow the case being watched. The existence of a
double jurisdiction in a foreign country being scarcely compatible with the
discipline of an army, it is evidence that there would be some difficulty in
carrying out any other arrangement." Hall, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 250-51.
Adinolfi states: "Exemption in the case of the army and that in the case
of warships have a single basis.
"Both the army and warships are autonomous entities having, within
each State, their own laws, their own judge, their own executive powers;
this establishes the force of discipline. The soldier of the land and of the sea
must obey his hierarchical superior alone.
"If other powers had the competence to intervene, this bond would be
severed. Now whatever the unit is, the bond must be kept unbroken."
Diritto International Penale, Hearings, H.S. Res. 309, supra, note 1, at 411.
Travers states: "The members of a foreign army, taken in this quality,
that is to say, considered as an integral part of the public force of a foreign
State, can not be subjected to the local repressive jurisdiction without
there being a conflict with the sovereignty of the foreign State, and in-
terfering with its right of free disposition of its armed forces.
"Again a government which accepts the presence of foreign troops on its
territory consents implicitly that the foreign authorities retain over such
troops the exclusive jurisdiction which is necessary for the perfect mainte-
nance of discipline." 2 Le Droit Penal International, 346-47 (1921)
.
Calvo, although he says that "When an independent state accords to a
foreign army permission to pass or to sojourn on its territory, the persons
who compose that army, or find themselves in its ranks, have a right to the
perogatives of exterritoriality," says also that: "One understands without
difficulty the dangers and the inconveniences of all sorts to which troops in
passage would be exposed if their direction and their police were taken
from their own officers to be exercised by foreign authorities." 1 Le Droit
International, 616 (3d ed. 1880).
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most compelling basis. Rather, it is the relationship between an
individual and the sending state resulting from his status as a
member of its armed forces and not nationality which compels
recognition of the sending state's jurisdiction. 15
Merchant seamen are subject to the flag state's jurisdiction to
prescribe rules even though they may not be its nationals. Cer-
tainly there is a much stronger reason for recognizing such juris-
diction over members of a state's armed forces. The jurisdiction
of a state to prescribe rules with respect to its nationals abroad is
recognized; however, there are considerations of policy both for
and against its exercise, and most states have found the considera-
tions against it to be more persuasive. But where troops are in-
volved there is no need to give as a reason for recognizing the
jurisdiction of the sending state that their conduct abroad may
disturb the public order of the sending state. There is nothing
shocking in the idea of subjecting military personnel to the court-
martial jurisdiction of the state they serve and of making them
liable to its operation in whatever part of the world they may be.
On the contrary, the idea is startling that a soldier abroad should
be free of all restraints except those which the receiving state
chooses to impose. In other words, those considerations of policy
which bear upon the wisdom of asserting jurisdiction over na-
tionals with respect to their conduct abroad are largely irrelevant
in the case of troops. The relevant considerations are rather those
which underlie the exercise of jurisdiction on the protective prin-
ciple, that is, those which concern the security of the state. 16
Military discipline is a broad term. One can differentiate be-
i5 «The relationship established when an alien becomes a member of the
national forces of a state gives the state jurisdiction to prescribe rules
governing the conduct of the alien, notwithstanding the fact that the service
in the national forces does not make him a national of the state." Restate-
ment, Foreign Relations Law, Section 31, Comment c, p. 92.
18 "A state has jurisdiction to prescribe rules attaching legal consequences
to * * * (b) conduct of any person who is a member of its national forces."
Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, Section 31. "Whatever may be the rule
of international law as regards the ordinary citizen, we have not been
referred to any rule of international law or principle of the comity of na-
tions which is inconsistent with a State exercising disciplinary control over
its own armed forces, when those forces are operating outside its terri-
torial limits." Spenz, C. J., in Mohammad Mohy-ud-Din v. The King Em-
peror, Federal Court, India, May 9, 1946, [1946] Ann. Dig. 94 (No. 40).
The accused was not a British subject. See also Rex v. Page, Courts-
Martial Appeal Court, England, Nov. 10, 1953, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 188;
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tween violations of military discipline which relate directly to, and
those only remotely related to, the performance of military duty.
One would expect most violations of local criminal law to fall into
the latter category. It can be said, of course, that the maintenance
of discipline requires holding troops to a standard of conduct at
all times whether they are on or off duty.17
The relationship between a visiting armed force and the re-
ceiving state is of paramount importance, for violations of local
law may affect not only its ability to maintain itself as an effec-
tive force but its right to remain in the foreign country. The fact
cannot be ignored that troops in uniform are less likely to be con-
sidered as individuals and more likely simply to be identified with
the sending state, than even the most obviously British, French or
American tourist or businessman. It is understandable, therefore,
that a sending state should make violations of the local criminal
law a breach of its military regulations, and its right to do so can
hardly be challenged.
Whether the sending state must be able to exercise enforcement
jurisdiction over its troops in the territory of the receiving state
is a different issue. It is not quite true that the right to prescribe
with respect to conduct abroad is valueless unless there is a cor-
relative right to enforce. Theoretically, it is possible to postpone
the exercise of the right to enforce until the offender is again on
the territory of the sending state, and practically this is the pro-
cedure followed in cases involving an ordinary citizen. States that
Lahis v. Minister of Defence, Israel, Supreme Court, Feb. 1, 1949, [1949]
Ann. Dig. 96 (No. 34).
17 "It is elementary that in order to carry out a military purpose it is
necessary that the commander be able to maintain discipline. This requires
that he have complete control over members of his forces at all times and
in all places. If a foreign force is permitted to intervene and break this
relationship, the military commander loses control over his forces and not
only is his power to maintain discipline removed in the instances where
this actually occurs but it is weakened in all instances by the knowledge
that such interference is possible. If the soldier is subject to the civil au-
thorities for acts committed when 'off duty' it is evident that the power of
the military authorities to prevent such occurrences is practically nullified."
U.S. Memorandum, Hearings, H.J. Res. 309, supra, note 1, at 417.
"It is not, of course, a matter of the Defense Department not wishing to
have exclusive jurisdiction over its own people abroad. Every military
commander would, of course, prefer for disciplinary reasons to have such
exclusive jurisdiction." Mr. Brucker, Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Defense (later
Sec. of the Army) , id., at 238.
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exercise jurisdiction over their nationals for acts done abroad, or
over aliens with respect to conduct abroad, do not presume to
exercise enforcement jurisdiction in the territory of the state
where the offense occurred. While undefined but narrowly limited
jurisdiction may be exercised on board a merchant vessel in a
foreign harbor by the flag state, a more extensive jurisdiction
may be exercised on board a warship in a foreign harbor. Such
jurisdiction may not, however, be exercised on shore, even with
respect to the crew of a warship, without the express consent of
the territorial state, except, perhaps, through a limited power
to police.
Does military exigency require the recognition of a more exten-
sive jurisdiction to enforce in the case of armed forces passing
through or stationed on the territory of a foreign state than is
needed in the case of a visiting warship? It seems clear that it
does. 38 Such forces perform their duties, often for long periods,
in the territory of the foreign state, rather than primarily on a
warship which is only temporarily in its harbor. Returning them
to the sending state for trial for every infraction of discipline
would be not only prejudicial to the effective administration of
justice—as well as prohibitively expensive—but disruptive of the
efficiency of the force. 19
18 "Except as otherwise expressly indicated by the territorial state, its
consenting to the presence of a foreign force within its territory implies
that it consents to the exercise of the sending state's jurisdiction to enforce,
with respect to the members of the force, rules reasonably necessary for
the internal administration and discipline of the force." Restatement, Foreign
Relations Law, Section 59, p. 188.
19 "[I]f you are to have visiting forces in a country at all they must be
able to operate their own disciplinary system. That would be a reasonable
exception to the rule that they are not governed by their own law but by the
laws of the countries which they visit. If they visit countries as a military
force under military regulation and military discipline it is in every way
reasonable that they should be allowed to operate their own military law
so far as the members of their forces are concerned." Mr. Sidney Silver-
man, 505 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.) 594 (1952).
But Italy "felt obliged under Italian law to maintain that United States
courts-martial could not constitutionally operate on Italian soil. We do not
believe that the Italian view * * * can be written off as one of their na-
tional idiosyncrasies." Secretary of Defense Wilson, Hearings on H.R.
8704 Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
3447 (1957). It should be noted that the Italian position was based on Italian
constitutional law, not on international law.
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The conclusion that the military authorities of the sending
state must be able to exercise enforcement jurisdiction in the re-
ceiving state should not, however, blind one to the fact that even
in this area military exigency is a relative term. Military exigency
is also the principal argument for recognizing the right of the
military authorities of the sending state to exercise jurisdiction
over civilian employees and dependents accompanying the visiting
force. As will be pointed out below, the negotiators of the NATO
Agreement recognized the primary jurisdiction of the sending
state over civilian employees as a concession to the United States,
not from conviction, and denied it with respect to dependents.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has denied the jurisdiction of
American courts-martial over both civilian employees and de-
The Czechoslovak Military Court of Appeal in London held in the Allied
Forces (Czechoslovakia) case, July 15, 1942, [1941-1942] Ann. Dig. 123
(No. 31), that a Czechoslovak Military Court could sit in Great Britain
only if authorized to do so by British law, and therefore could not try a
Czechoslovak officer for an offence committed prior to the effective date of
the Allied Forces Act, 1940.
The comments of Mr. Justice Clark in his dissenting opinion in Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), although they relate to the alternatives to trial
of dependents by courts-martial, are pertinent. He said, at 88
:
"Likewise, trial of offenders by an Article III court in this country, per-
haps workable in some cases, is equally impracticable as a general solution
to the problem. The hundreds of petty cases involving blackmarket opera-
tions, narcotics, immorality, and the like, could hardly be brought here for
prosecution even if the Congress and the foreign nation involved authorized
such a procedure. Aside from the tremendous waste of the time of military
personnel and the resultant disruptions as well as the large expenditure of
money necessary to bring witnesses and evidence to the United States, the
deterrent effect of the prosecution would be nil because of the delay and
distance at which it would be held. Furthermore, compulsory process is an
essential to any system of justice. The attendance of foreign nationals as
witnesses at a judicial proceeding in this country could rest only on a
voluntary basis and depositions could not be required. As a matter of in-
ternational law such attendance could never be compelled and the court in
such a proceeding would be powerless to control this vital element in its
procedure. In short, this solution could only result in the practical abdica-
tion of American judicial authority over most of the offenses committed by
American civilians in foreign countries."
See also Mr. Justice Clark's comment along the same lines in his opinion
for the majority in the companion case, reversed on rehearing, of Kinsella
v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956), note 12, at 479, and that of Mr. Justice
Harlan in his concurring opinion in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), note
12, at 76.
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pendents.20 The issue in these cases is not, of course, quite the
same, but the principal argument was that military exigency—the
need to maintain discipline—required recognition of the juris-
diction.21
The other side of this coin concerns the right of the receiving
20 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234
(1960) ; Grisham v. Hagen, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) ; McElroy v. Guagliardo
and Wilson v. Bohlender, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
81 Mr. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1,71 (1957), said:
"The Government, it seems to me, has made a strong showing that the
court-martial of civilian dependents abroad has a close connection to the
proper and effective functioning of our overseas military contingents. * * *
Suffice it to say that to all intents and purposes these civilian dependents
are part of the military community overseas, are so regarded by the host
country, and must be subjected to the same discipline if the military com-
mander is to have the power to prevent activities which would jeopardize
the security and effectiveness of his command."
In a footnote, the Justice added : "This necessity is particularly acute with
regard to peculiarly 'military' and 'local' offenses which must be dealt with
swiftly and effectively. Thus security regulations at these military installa-
tions must be enforced against civilian dependents as well as servicemen;
the same is true of base traffic violations, black marketeering, misuse of
military customs and post-exchange privileges."
Mr. Justice Clark, in his dissenting opinion, said, at 83: "It cannot be
denied that disciplinary problems have been multiplied and complicated by
this influx of civilians onto military bases, and Congress has provided that
military personnel and civilians alike shall be governed by the same law
administered by the same courts."
He then quoted the following from Judge Latimer's opinion in United
States v. Burney, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 776; 21 C.M.R. 98 (1956) :
"[It] is readily ascertainable that black market transactions, trafficking
in habit-forming drugs, unlawful currency circulation, promotion of illicit
sex relations, and a myriad of other crimes which may be perpetrated by
persons closely connected with one of the services, could have a direct and
forceful impact on the efficiency and discipline of the command. One need
only view the volume of business transacted by military courts involving,
for instance, the sale and use of narcotics in the Far East, to be shocked
into a realization of the truth of the previous statements. If the Services
have no power within their own systems to punish that type of offender,
then indeed overseas crimes between civilians and military personnel will
flourish and that amongst civilians will thrive unabated and untouched. A
few civilians plying an unlawful trade in military communities can,
without fail, impair the discipline and combat readiness of a unit * * *."
Mr. Justice Clark added: "In addition, it is reasonable to provide that the
military commander who bears full responsibility for the care and safety of
those civilians attached to his command should also have authority to
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state to exercise jurisdiction with respect to action taken against
a member of the armed forces of the sending state by its military
authorities. If an individual arrested, tried, and punished by such
authorities has a cause of action in the court of the receiving
state for assault, false arrest, or false imprisonment, or if a writ
of habeas corpus may be issued, then the sending state has no
effective power to exercise enforcement jurisdiction in the re-
ceiving state. Alternatively, if the accused's remedy in a court
of the receiving state is limited to obtaining a review in the
nature of a proceeding in error, or is even more limited, to a pro-
ceeding testing whether the military authorities of the sending
state acted within their jurisdiction, then the military authorities
have a right, limited but significant, to exercise enforcement juris-
diction. If the accused has no recourse to the courts of the re-
ceiving state, the enforcement jurisdiction of the sending state is
complete. Extensive though perhaps not necessarily complete im-
munity from the supervisory jurisdiction of the receiving state is
seemingly a necessary corollary of the right of the sending state
to exercise enforcement jurisdiction in the receiving state.22
It has been asserted that Chief Justice Marshall, in referring
to the immunity of foreign armed forces from local jurisdiction,
had in mind only this immunity from the supervisory jurisdiction
of the local courts, not that of the troops from local criminal
jurisdiction. His language can be so read and the view that it
should be has elicited impressive support,23 but the argument for
the traditional reading seems persuasive.24
regulate their conduct. Moreover, all members of an overseas contingent
should receive equal treatment before the law. In their actual day-to-day
living they are a part of the same unique communities, and the same legal
considerations should apply to all. There is no reason for according to one
class a different treatment than is accorded to another. The effect of such a
double standard on discipline, efficiency, and morale can easily be seen."
(at 85).
22 "Under the rule stated in this Section, the territorial state may not
treat the actions of the military authorities of the sending state in their
exercise of its jurisdiction as though they were illegal acts under the law
of the territorial state." Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, Comment a
to Section 59, p. 189.
28 Barton, 1949 Brit. Yb. Int'l L., op. cit. supra, note 4, at 384. See the
statement of the Attorney General, 99 Cong. Rec. 8767 (1953) and the
statement of Senator Ferguson entitled "Immunity of Friendly Foreign
Forces under International Law," 99 Cong. Rec. 8759 (1953).
"Wright v. Cantrell, [1943] 44 S.R.N.S.W. 45; [1943-1945] Ann. Dig.
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The right to exercise enforcement jurisdiction referred to is,
however, a jurisdiction over the armed forces of the sending state,
not over the citizens or residents of the receiving state who have
no connection with those forces. The effective administration of
justice requires the power to compel the attendance of witnesses
and the production of documents and to punish for contempt and
perjury. It will be recalled that the lack of such power over
others than its own nationals was a major weakness when the
United States exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction in China. It
seems most unlikely, nevertheless, that military exigency would
ever be viewed as sufficiently compelling to justify the exercise
of jurisdiction by the sending state over other than its armed
forces, unless the authority of the territorial state was no longer
operative in the area.25
The effective exercise of enforcement jurisdiction likewise re-
quires, if not police power in the visiting forces,26 at least the
sympathetic cooperation of the local police. For the local police to
arrest for a violation of the sending state's military regulations
is, however, for them to undertake to enforce foreign penal law,
and to turn the offender over to the authorities of the sending
(No. 37), cited by Dr. Barton, reflects the view that the approach to the im-
munity of armed forces should be in functional terms, but does not, it is
submitted, indicate the belief that only immunity from supervisory jurisdic-
tion is, in those terms, necessary.
26 In Ministere Public v. Saelens, Court Martial of Ypres, Belgium, Oct.
25, 1945, [1946] Ann. Dig. 85 (No. 35), the accused was charged with
offences against the safety of the Allied armies in Belgium. He contended
that a domiciliary search had been carried out by British MPs without a
regular warrant. In dismissing the charges the court said: "The military
police of an allied occupying Power is not competent to resort to domiciliary
search for the purpose of investigating and repressing offences subject to
Belgian law. No Belgian law grants British Military Police such rights.
On the contrary, the Convention concluded on May 16, 1944 in London be-
tween the Belgian Government and allied Governments provided that Bel-
gains who have committed crimes or delicts against allied armies shall be
summoned before Belgian Courts Martial and that the crimes and delicts
shall be investigated and punished in accordance with Belgian law."
26 The British Government, in the World War I negotiations with the
United States, indicated its belief that police power could not be exercised
by the American military authorities outside the limits of their camps with-
out the express consent of the British government. See p. 120, infra. See
also Barton, 1954 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 341. The United States Congress ap-
parently assumed the contrary, in enacting the Service Courts of Friendly
Foreign Forces Act. See p. 132, infra.
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state is equivalent to extradition.27 It is evident that the existence
of such power in the local police might be successfully challenged
and that the officer who exercised it might incur civil liability.28
The issues thus raised are quite distinct from the issue whether
the jurisdiction of the sending state both to prescribe and to en-
force as to its forces in the receiving state is exclusive or the re-
ceiving state has concurrent jurisdiction. The argument that the
sending state must have jurisdiction over its forces is compelling.
That military exigency demands that such jurisdiction be exclu-
sive is much more debatable and is indeed the crucial question.
Exercise of jurisdiction by the receiving state does not, in a
direct sense, preclude the sending state from maintaining dis-
cipline. Even if an act is a much more serious offense under the
military law of the sending state than under the criminal law of
the receiving state, as may well be true, it does not necessarily
follow that the sending state should have exclusive jurisdiction,
though common sense would suggest that the receiving state
should recognize a prior claim in the sending state.29 More is,
however, involved. Maintaining discipline, like maintaining re-
spect for any system of criminal law, requires prompt prosecu-
tion. Concurrent jurisdiction, or rules for determining priority
of jurisdiction which are less than clear cut, can occasion delay
—
which can be disruptive of discipline. A rule allocating exclusive
or primary jurisdiction to the sending state could have the large
advantage of eliminating such delays.
It has been said that a commander must be able not only to
27
It was, however, held in Katzu Officer Commanding the Polish Military
Prison, Jerusalem, Supreme Court, Palestine, July 7, 1944, [1943-1945] Ann.
Dig. 165 (No. 45), that the fact a member of a foreign force was ir-
regularly handed over to the military police of that force after apprehen-
sion by the local civil police did not deprive the foreign court martial of
jurisdiction.
28 "To justify his detention on British soil, authority must be found in the
law of this country. * * *" Viscount Caldecote, C.J., In Re Amand [1941],
2 K.B. 239, a habeas corpus proceeding brought by a Dutch citizen arrested
pursuant to the Allied Forces Act for desertion from the Netherlands forces.
29 "[T]here may well be cases in which an offense may be a trifling matter
from the point of view of our domestic law but a serious breach of dis-
cipline from the point of view of the military authorities. In such cases
common sense would require the offender to be handed over to the military
authorities to be dealt with, just as the British soldier is handed over in
similar circumstances." Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, Home Secretary, 505 H.C.
Deb. (5th ser.) 566-67 (1952).
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maintain discipline but to maintain control over his command. It
is true that the exercise of jurisdiction by the receiving state re-
moves the accused from the control of the sending state, and his
unavailability may reduce the effectiveness of the force.30 The
"for want of a nail" approach can, however, be pushed too far.
The alternative to the exercise of jurisdiction by the receiving
state is not complete immunity, but trial by a court-martial of the
visiting forces, and the availability for duty of the offender, at
least in an emergency, can be as much affected by his court-
martial and imprisonment in a military prison as by his deten-
tion, trial and imprisonment by the receiving state. The argument
that if one soldier may be imprisoned a thousand may be 31 is
80 The Canadian Factum refers to the "* * * fundamental principle which
requires that the commander of the visiting troops be not interfered with in
the control and disposition of his forces * * *," and continues: "It is diffi-
cult to see how a visiting allied force could fully and efficiently function as
an organization of the State to which it belongs if its members who remain
component parts thereof and subject to be called to action at any time as
long as they retain their connection therewith, were liable to be arrested,
prosecuted and detained by the local authorities for offenses committed by
them while on leave." Hearings, H.J. Res. 309, supra, note 1, at 431.
It was said in the British Parliament that: "Clearly, if a body of foreign
troops is serving in this country it is far better that they should serve under
their own code of discipline than be amenable to the courts of this country.
* * * Under our own code, for a British soldier to fight a citizen of a
foreign country in which he happens to serve is a much more serious offence
under the military code than under the civil code. Obviously an American
commander, just like a British commander who has British troops serving
in America, is very concerned about the reputation of the troops under his
command and the maintenance of discipline. It would not be much use un-
less he had effective control, and * * * it is of paramount importance that
American commanders should have control of their forces here. * * * The
point which we are really discussing is who is to control the forces * * *
are they to be effectively controlled by the American commander or by the
chairman of the bench of magistrates in the area in which they are serving.
I prefer that effective control shall rest in the hands of the American com-
mander." Mr. George Wigg, 505 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.) 1073-76 (1952).
81 "But more important even than the weakening of discipline by the
exercise of divided authority is the fact that it gives to the local authorities
the power to remove a nation's troops from its control, for if one soldier
can be arrested and imprisoned by the local authorities so can a thousand.
If enlisted men can be arrested and imprisoned, so can their officers, in-
cluding even the commander of the forces himself. Thus also the purpose for
which the forces were admitted can be defeated and the local sovereign be
placed in the contradictory position of permitting the foreign forces to
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not entirely persuasive. A thousand may be imprisoned only if
there is a reasonable basis for saying they have committed a
thousand crimes. The alternative is to assume that a receiving
state would deliberately undertake to arrest innocent men, pre-
sumably with the deliberate intent of crippling the foreign force.
Power may be abused, but abuse of power on such a scale seems
unlikely—even though there may be degrees of friendship be-
tween friendly allies.
The argument that a commander must have exclusive control
over his forces at all times has not proved compelling with re-
spect to the crews of warships on shore leave. Its weight with
respect to land forces has been challenged on pragmatic grounds
by an American judge of the Egyptian Mixed Courts 32 and ques-
tioned by the Departments of State and Defense.33
The advent of nuclear weapons, especially those married to
missiles, suggests, however, a need to reappraise the issues of dis-
cipline and control. Now that the reaction time available to re-
spond to a nuclear onslaught is measured in minutes, the need
for strict discipline and complete control within a command can
be imperative. Moreover, to distinguish between those troops
come on his territory to accomplish a purpose and then preventing them
from accomplishing it." U.S. Memorandum, Hearings, H.J. Res. 309, supra,
note 1, at 417.
82 "Certainly the fears expressed by Colonel King find no support in the
acid test of practical experience, as exhibited in the score or more of cases
in which the principle was applied in Egypt. In no quarter was the sugges-
tion seriously made that the trial before the courts of the land of offenders
against the public peace had in any manner obstructed military discipline."
Brinton, "The Egyptian Mixed Courts and Foreign Armed Forces," 40
A.J.I.L. 737, 739 (1946).
83 General Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State, in a letter to
Senator Wiley, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said:
"It is the opinion of the Departments of State and Defense, that it is
neither necessary nor desirable for the United States to seek or have exclu-
sive jurisdiction by treaty over its forces, civilian components, or their
dependents in the NATO countries. * * *
After quoting the opinions of Generals Bradley and Ridgway, he con-
tinued :
"It would therefore appear clearly to be established that exclusive jurisdic-
tion of our forces, civilian components, or dependents abroad, is not neces-
sary from the military point of view. I wish to add my personal endorse-
ment, based upon my own military experience, to that conclusion." 99 Cong.
Rec, pp. 8776-77 (1953).
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armed with nuclear weapons and others could well involve a too
great security risk.
B. The Interests of Individuals
Debate in the United States regarding immunity for our troops
abroad has centered not on military exigency but on the interests
of the accused. It is the thought of a seaman or soldier unjustly
accused and unfairly tried, confined in a foreign prison, rather
than of a warship or army rendered less effective, which has
troubled many. The legalistic answer is that immunities are ac-
corded to protect the interests of the state, not the individual.
With that answer the ordinary citizen,34 accused of a crime
abroad, must be content. The same is true for the majority of
government employees stationed abroad. This does not mean, of
course, that the individual or his government must acquiesce in
any treatment he may receive at the hands of a foreign govern-
ment. He is protected by the ordinary rules of international law
concerning the denial of justice, and a member of the armed
forces is entitled to the same protection.
The case of a member of the armed forces can be distinguished
from that of the ordinary citizen only if it can be related to mili-
tary exigency. It has been said that immunity for our forces has
a bearing upon morale, but the evidence suggests that at least in
practice the argument lacks factual support. 35 Again, it has
84 See 2 Hackworth Digest of Intel-national Law 84 (1940-41). That a
person is an American citizen does not "give him an immunity to commit
crimes in other countries, nor entitle him to demand, of right, a trial in any
mode other than that allowed to its own people by the country whose law
he has violated * * *." Neely v. Henkel (No. 1), 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901).
85 General Hickman, Ass't. Judge Advocate General, Department of the
Army (later Judge Advocate General) testified in the Hearings before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Service, United States Senate,
84th Congress, 1st Sess., 40, March 29, 31 and June 21, 1955, that "The
comments which have been received from field commanders and from Judge
Advocates in the field, our legal officers, indicate that in all but a very few
countries the operation whereby military jurisdiction is shared with foreign
courts has not had an unhealthy effect upon the accomplishment of our mili-
tary missions or upon the morale and discipline of our forces.
"The significant exceptions are French Morocco and Turkey where ex-
tended delays in investigations and trials have, to a certain extent, impaired
morale and discipline."
For General Hickman's comments on individual countries, see id., at 16.
Among the more interesting are
:
"The service commanders concerned have reported that arrangements and
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legal procedures relative to the exercise of jurisdiction in Canada are entirely
satisfactory and have resulted in no different effect on the station mission,
morale, and discipline than if this station were located in the United States."
Id., at 34. "The Air Force commanders state that the jurisdictional arrange-
ments in French Morocco have had a negligible impact on the accomplish-
ment of their mission, but that the slowness of the local judicial process of
the local courts has adversely affected morale and discipline, while the possi-
bility of trial by local courts has had a positive effect on discipline." Id., at
36. "The Navy commander states that an amicable relationship exists be-
tween the military and Philippine authorities under existing arrangements,
and that the exercise of jurisdiction by Philippine authorities over our per-
sonnel has favorably affected the morale and discipline of our forces." Id.,
at 37.
General Hickman testified in the hearing before the same subcommittee on
February 9, 1956 that: "The comments which have been received from com-
manders in the field indicate that although some are adverse to the jurisdic-
tional arrangements, nevertheless in all but one of the countries in which by
agreement military jurisdiction is shared with foreign courts they consider
that these arrangements have not had a detrimental effect upon the accom-
plishment of our military missions or upon the morale and discipline of the
members of the forces. The exception is French Morocco where extended
delays in investigations and trial have, to a certain extent, impaired morale
and discipline." p. 32. "The Air Force commander (in French Morocco)
states that the jurisdictional arrangements have had no direct effect upon
the accomplishment of the mission of the command. He reports, however,
that morale of personnel involved in minor offenses is affected by long de-
lays between the date of the offense and the date of final adjudication,
and that the amount of time spent by other personnel in assisting the ac-
cused and in monitoring proceedings is disproportionate to the offense in
the majority of cases." p. 29. "The Army and Air Force commanders (in the
Philippines) report that, except for minor inconvenience in some cases,
jurisdictional arrangements have had no adverse effect upon the accomplish-
ment of the mission or upon the morale and efficiency of the forces. The
Navy commander reports that 'the impact upon morale had been quite
favorable and at the same time the posed threat of arrest and conviction by
Philippine courts with possible imprisonment in a Philippine jail contribute
to good discipline/ " p. 29. "The Army and Navy commanders (in Canada)
have reported that jurisdictional arrangements have had no adverse effects
upon the morale and efficiency of their forces. The Air Force commander
has stated that 'local jurisdictional arrangements have been of such a
highly satisfactory nature as to assist this command in the performance of
its mission/ " p. 25.
In the April 9, 1957 Hearing before the Subcommittee General Hickman
again testified regarding the situation in various countries. "The Army com-
mander in France has reported that the jurisdictional arrangements have
had no significant effect upon the accomplishment of his mission. He stated
that * * * the personnel of his command are tending more and more to
accept as normal the right of French authorities to exercise jurisdiction in
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been urged that, unlike ordinary citizens, members of the armed
forces go abroad involuntarily. They nevertheless go at the order
of the sending, not the receiving state.36 This suggests that the
sending state shall do all it can to ensure that members of its
armed forces receive every protection which the law of the re-
ceiving state affords an accused. This duty the United States has
recognized in full measure. It may suggest also that the sending
state should do all it can to secure immunity from the receiving
state's jurisdiction for its forces. It is much less clear that the
receiving state has any obligation to accord immunity to the mem-
bers of a visiting force because they are, in a personal sense,
within its territory involuntarily. The belief that there is no
convincing basis for distinguishing the case of a member of the
armed forces from that of an ordinary citizen has led some to
conclude they should be equally subject to the jurisdiction of the
receiving state.37
matters of a nonmilitary nature. However, he stated that the French pro-
cedure permitting the combined trial of criminal and civil actions is still a
source of irritation and dissatisfaction.*******
"He (the Air Force Commander) stated also that time delays between the
occurrence of an incident within the primary jurisdiction of France and the
decision by French authorities whether to retain their jurisdiction have
adversely affected his disciplinary control and the prompt administration of
military justice. That would be because he would have to hold up dis-
ciplinary action in a case while waiting to learn whether he could try it by
court-martial." p. 17.
86 [A]s to the implied preferential treatment which might or should be
given to a soldier because he is drafted and sent abroad, of course, I am
extremely sympathetic to that thought: I have been at this for a long time.
But technically, the fact remains that a soldier who is sent abroad, regard-
less of whether he is drafted or whether he volunteers, goes abroad at the
will of the United States and at the will of the United States Congress, so
technically, I believe, as far as civil offenses are concerned, and subject al-
ways to the safeguards of denial of justice which the United States always
holds, and subject always to the fact that the United States will not itself
in similar cases and under identical conditions relinquish its sovereignty,
there should not be preferential treatment." General Smith, Under Secre-
tary of State, Hearings, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
Status of Forces, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1953).
87 "I can see no reason why the United States should feel that such a con-
dition should attach to these persons any more than to other American
citizens present overseas on their own or official business. The standard of
conduct and of jurisdiction should be identical." General Smith, Under
Secretary of State, letter to Senator Wiley, 99 Cong. Rec, 8777 (1953).
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Those who feel that the case of a member of the armed forces
is different from that of the ordinary citizen have made much of
the point that American troops, if subject to the jurisdiction of
the local courts, would be tried under a system of law with which
they are not familiar 38 and, particularly, would not enjoy the
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.39 The force
of the latter argument is somewhat diminished because not all
constitutional guarantees apply to actions by a state or to 'courts
martial. Apart from this, the force of the argument varies from
country to country, depending on the rights which an accused en-
joys in each. There is need, in this connection, to distinguish be-
tween those rights which the organic law guarantees and those
which in practice are accorded. There can be an abuse of rights
of the accused in any system. One should not compare systems
of criminal law in terms of the theoretical protection accorded by
one and the abuses which may occur, in practice, in another, un-
less, of course, those abuses are chronic. Again, the United States
Senate included in the instrument of ratification of the NATO
"It seems to me that we should be concerned with whether or not an
American citizen, whether a member of our Armed Forces, a dependent, or
part of our civilian force, is accorded the same rights and privileges, and is
tried under the same procedure that any citizen of that receiving state
charged with a similar criminal offense would be entitled to have." Senator
George, Hearings, Sen. For. Rel. Com., NATO Treaties, supra, note 3, at 49.
See also Congressman Fulton's statement, Hearings, H.J. Res. 309, supra,
note 1, at 25: "The general question comes up how much protection can or
should be given by the United States Government to United States nationals,
military or civilian, abroad. Should the United States ask for the protec-
tion of United States courts and justice for every civilian who goes abroad
as a tourist, so long as he has a visa and a passport? How far should or
can the United States go in this general field? Or should the United States
make a special case of United States servicemen who are stationed abroad
either voluntarily or involuntarily, and extend the protection beyond the
line of their duty, when servicemen are traveling as tourists or are out of
uniform in civilian life in the foreign country."
88 The argument can in general be made only with respect to procedure,
since an offense against local law is normally an offense under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. This is recognized in Senator Bricker's statement:
"The fact is that American servicemen are reasonably familiar with the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and their rights thereunder. They do not
know and we do not know anything about the criminal procedure of the
other NATO countries and Japan." 99 Cong. Rec, 8747 (1953).
"See the remarks of Senator McCarran, 99 Cong. Rec, 8732-8734;
Senator Dirksen, id., at 8773.
100
Agreement a statement establishing a procedure for safeguarding
the rights of the members of our forces.40 The Senate directive
has been vigorously implemented by the several services.
Trial by a court-martial of the sending state also means that
the accused is tried by his fellow nationals. There is much
evidence that this factor has been paramount in the minds of
many who have felt most strongly that the United States should
have exclusive jurisdiction over its forces abroad.41 The same
point has been in part responsible for the refusal of some states
to extradite their own nationals. The counter argument is that
normally a man's appropriate judges, particularly in the common
law system, are deemed to be those resident where the crime was
committed.
A related point is that a court-martial conducted by the send-
ing state has the great advantage, from the standpoint of the ac-
cused, that the prosecutor and judges speak his language.42 From
the standpoint of the victim, the witnesses who are residents of
40 See page 261, infra.
4i «* * * |-j-j n my. humt>ie opinion they still should be tried by Americans
under the American system." Congressman Bow, Hearings, H.J. Res. 309,
supra, note 1, at 19.
"I don't know of anyone who would want to be tried, whether guilty or
innocent, in a foreign court." Congressman Le Compte, id., at 21.
"I think the difference as to this question of trial by jury, even in Great
Britain where our common law came from, is that he does not have a trial
by jury of his peers, because his peers could only have been of his own
country." Congressman Richards, id., at 104.
"* * * a man presumably might not get a trial by jury, if he is tried by
court-martial, but * * * he would get a trial by Americans." Congressman
Adair, id., at 104.
"Anglo-American criminal law is rooted in the principle that the accused
may be tried only by his fellow citizens and only by those citizens who
reside near the scene of the alleged crime. Here we are concerned with the
rights of Americans in a military rather than a civilian community. In
essence, however, the same principle is involved. Shall Americans subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States be tried by other Americans who live
in the vicinity of the scene of the alleged crime?" Senator Bricker, 99
Cong. Rec, 8741 (1953).
42 Congressman Rodino referred to "[T]he handicap of his being tried in a
foreign country. First, he is not fluent in the language, even though he may
have some knowledge of that in which he is being tried. He is in a land
of nationals foreign to him in every sense of the word. Their customs,
their laws, their attitudes are strange to him." Hearings, H.J. Res. 309,
supra, note 1, at 66.
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the receiving state and local officials who may be involved, it has
the great disadvantage that the judges and prosecutor may not
speak their language.43 Serious offenses against the local law
normally involve some local residents; even minor offenses, e.g.,
traffic violations, involve at least the arresting officer. The issue
is more than one of convenience, since it goes to the fairness of
the trial, from the standpoint of all concerned.
A related issue is that of possible prejudice, reflected in the
manner and diligence with which the investigation and prosecu-
tion are pursued, in the way in which the trial is conducted, in
the verdict, and in the severity of the sentence. Fear has been
expressed that prejudice against foreigners, and particularly
against American troops, would be shown in trials of members of
our forces in foreign courts.44 There is, of course, a possibility
of prejudice in favor of the accused if the trial is before a court-
martial of the sending state.
C. The Interests of the Receiving State
The status of forces problem requires more than gauging the
significance of such concepts as the equality and independence of
states and weighing the demands of military exigency and of
protection of the individual. These must be balanced against the
legitimate interests of the receiving state.
" Judge Brinton, referring to the cases which arose in Egypt in World
War II, said: "Indeed practical considerations suggest strong reasons in
favor of the exercise of the civil authority. The offenses in question were,
by their very definition, committed outside the military precincts and in-
variably involved, or were directed against, members of the civilian popula-
tion. They also involved the intervention of the local police and the setting
in motion of those measures of immediate record of the facts recorded in
an official proces-verbal which forms, in general, such an admirable feature
of European criminal systems. For the most part they have been brawls
and shootings in the public street and in cafes, or robberies or other similar
offenses affecting public peace and order, where the language used by the
available witnesses has often been one with which the military authorities
are unfamiliar. The difficulties presented by the trial of such cases by a
court-martial remote from the scene of the offense are obvious." Brinton,
"The Egyptian Mixed Courts and Foreign Armed Forces," 40 A.J.I.L. 737,
739 (1946).
** "Their attitudes are bound to be unsympathetic to a transgressor in
their midst. Moreover, the very presence of our troops abroad causes irrita-
tions." Cong. Rodino, Hearings, H.J. Res. 309, supra, note 1, at 66; see also
comments of Senator Long, 99 Cong. Rec, 8778 (1953) ; and Senator
Hendrickson, id., at 8738.
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It will be recalled that primacy is normally accorded the terri-
torial principle. Anglo-American law in particular is rooted in
this concept. The receiving state therefore can stand upon the
strongest of the recognized bases of jurisdiction in claiming
jurisdiction over visiting forces. A major factor in this approach
has been the idea that the maintenance of order within its borders
is one of the highest functions of the modern state, and, by
necessity, peculiarly its function. Any state is understandably
reluctant to entrust the protection of the lives and property of its
citizens to a foreign state. States have generally been prepared
to show such trust unqualifiedly only in cases involving heads of
states and diplomats accredited to them. Other representatives
may enjoy immunity for criminal acts done in the performance
of official duty, but that such immunity exists is at best debatable.
All other immunities are hedged about with qualifications which,
in general, reflect the recognition of the interests of the territorial
state, particularly its basic right to protect the persons and
property of its citizens.
Attitudes with respect to the status of land forces have been
largely influenced by this fundamental consideration.45 The mis-
givings of receiving states asked to concede exclusive jurisdic-
tion over visiting forces have been met by recognition of the
moral if not the legal obligation of the sending state to punish
for violations of local law.46 There is no claim that visiting forces
46 «* * * [ 13 -fc is the protection of our own nationals which is being con-
fided to their criminal jurisdiction." Mr. Garro Jones, in the debate on The
United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, 382 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.)
886, (1942).
"We are reducing ourselves to the position in which certain countries
were put by us under the Capitulation Treaties." Mr. Clement Davies, id.,
at 894.
"I am not willing as a United States citizen to have foreigners in this
country not subject to our laws, when they are not on official or diplomatic
duties. I want them tried by United States courts for the protection of
United States citizens." Congressman Fulton, Hearings, H.J. Res. 309, supra,
note 1, at 89.
* 8 General Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State, referred to the
need "to ensure that the people of the countries who receive troops are pro-
tected with respect to their lives, their property and their security from
the illegal activities of foreign troops or civilians.
"It is a problem which always confronts us when we are operating in
allied countries. During the war it is met by stern measures. In time of
peace we have to apply all the legal safeguards which we ourselves, as a
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should be free to violate the local law at will.47 The situation
sometimes met in extradition cases, where a state refuses to
extradite its own national even though it is unable or unwilling to
try him under its own law, is not likely to arise.
The courts-martial of a sending state cannot, of course, directly
enforce the laws of the receiving state. When the United States
exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction in China, this raised a
major problem, for it was not clear what laws of the United
States could be considered as applicable to conduct in China. Nor
was there any general rule that any violation of Chinese law was
a violation of American law.
Today, the situation with respect to American troops abroad is
quite different. Not only are many acts made criminal if corn-
nation, feel necessary for its citizens." Hearings Sen. For. Rel. Com. NATO
Treaties, supra, note 3, at 3-4.
Colonel King commented: "It goes without saying that it is the right and
duty of the government of the host country to make sure that the persons
and property of its nationals are effectively protected against crimes by
members of the visiting forces, and that the latter's immunity from prosecu-
tion in the local courts is not used as a cloak to enable them to commit such
crimes with impunity. In the several expeditionary forces which the
United States sent to friendly foreign countries in the first World War and
in others, the military and naval officers in command have always been
ready to prosecute before their own courts-martial any member of their own
forces against whom the local authorities (or any individual national of
the host country) presented prima facie evidence of having committed a
crime or offense." Op. cit. supra, note 2, at 558.
The United Kingdom, in the Exchange of Notes which preceded the enact-
ment of the United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, 1942, stated
as one of the points on which it was indispensable first to reach an under-
standing, that the American authorities would assume responsibility for
trying and on conviction punishing those who were alleged on sufficient
evidence to have committed criminal offenses in the United Kingdom, infra,
page 130, n. 51.
47 "This problem is one with which the Navy has dealt with since the
Revolution, the fundamental policy being that individuals in another country
must abide by the laws and customs of that country and that extradition or
release from foreign jurisdiction is a matter of arbitration in each case."
Admiral Carney to Secretary of Defense Wilson, quoted at 99 Cong. Rec,
8770 (1953). The statement goes further, of course, and assumes the re-
ceiving state has concurrent jurisdiction to enforce. It should be noted that
the United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, 1942, was carefully
drafted to grant the American forces immunity only from the enforcement
jurisdiction of the British courts, not to exempt them from the obligation to
obey British laws. Infra, page 129.
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mitted by a member of the armed forces, wherever he may be,
but most though not quite all violations of the local criminal law
are offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This
does not resolve all difficulties, however, and neither are all the
objections of a receiving state answered. The sending state ex-
ercises jurisdiction through courts-martial, which may, and
normally do, sit in the receiving state. They may, indeed, be re-
quired to do so in some cases.48 This meets one of the basic ob-
jections to the exercise by a state of jurisdiction over offenses
committed abroad because the difficulty involved in the trans-
portation of witnesses or use of written statements is reduced.
The effective exercise of jurisdiction requires, however, the power
to investigate, arrest, summon witnesses, punish for contempt,
and the like. No state is likely to permit the military authorities
of the sending state to exercise such power over local residents,
and it certainly cannot be required to do so.
This difficulty can be overcome in part by arrangements for en-
listing the cooperation of the local authorities, but trial by the
sending state still means trial by court-martial. This is not the
place for an appraisal of courts-martial, or specifically, American
courts-martial, as legal institutions. It is true they are not civil
courts, or constituted as civil courts are constituted, but is this
relevant to the problem? For some it is, since it raises the issue
of the supremacy of the civil authorities over the military. In the
United Kingdom, and elsewhere in the Commonwealth, it is a
fundamental constitutional principle that a member of the British
armed forces is subject to the jurisdiction of the civil courts for
any offense against the civil law, in war and peace. Even con-
viction by a court-martial and the serving of any sentence im-
posed by it does not preclude trial and sentence by a civil court
for the same offense. 49 The rule in the United States is that
48 Both the United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, 1942, of
Great Britain 5 & 6 Geo. 6, C. 31 and our own Service Courts of Friendly
Foreign Forces Act, 22 U.S.C. 702 (1944), required trial in the vicinity if
the offense was against a civilian.
49 Professor Goodhart, in "The Legal Aspect of the American Forces in
Great Britain," 28 A.B.A.J. 762, 763 (1942), wrote that: "* * * [T]he
important constitutional principle * * * involved is one of the essential ones
on which the English constitution is based. It is described by Dicey as 'the
fixed doctrine of English law that a soldier, though a member of a standing
army, is in England subject to all the duties and liabilities of an ordinary
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courts-martial and the civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction,
although this may not be a constitutional requirement. 50 In most
European countries the jurisdiction of the military authorities
over the armed forces is exclusive.51
The risk against which the British constitutional principle is
citizen.' It is part—and perhaps the most important part—of 'the rule of
law* which is the distinctive feature of the British system. 'It becomes, too,
more and more apparent that the means by which the courts have main-
tained the law of the constitution have been the strict insistence upon the
two principles, first, of "equality before the law," which negatives exemp-
tion from the liabilities of ordinary citizens or from the jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts, and secondly, of "personal responsibility of wrongdoers,"
which excludes the notion that any breach of law on the part of a sub-
ordinate can be justified by the orders of his superiors/ This means that
the British soldier is subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, and
is responsible to them for any breaches of the law which he may commit.
So long as this principle is maintained, it will be impossible for any one to
establish a military dictatorship in Great Britain."
Professor Goodhart traced the history of the principle, noting a statute of
1399 (1 Henry IV, c. 14) ; a provision of the Petition of Right (1625) ; the
vigorous opinion of Lord Chief Justice Hale in the Case of Captain C
[(1673) 1 Ventris 251] in which he said that "It seems you are grown
very headstrong: that you who ought to know, that every officer and
soldier is as liable to be arrested as a tradesman. * * * You are the King's
servants, and intended for his defence against his enemies, and to preserve
the peace of the Kingdom, not to exempt yourself from the authority
of the laws. * * * Whatever you military men think, you shall find you are
under the civil jurisdiction, and you but gnaw a file, you will break your
teeth ere you shall prevail against it;" and the Mutiny Act of 1689, which
said that: "Provided always, That nothing in this Act contained shall
extend or be construed to exempt any Officer or Soldier whatsoever from
the ordinary processe of Law."
The principle, Professor Goodhart adds, has been so strictly maintained
that the doctrine of "autrefois convict" does not derogate from it, although
a soldier tried by a civil court cannot be tried for the same offense by a
court-martial. Moreover, the principle is not affected by war or insurrection.
60 "Courts-martial have exclusive jurisdiction of purely military offenses.
But a person subject to the code is, as a rule, subject to the law applicable to
persons generally, and if by an act or omission he violates the code and the
local criminal law, the act or omission may be made the basis of a prosecution
before a court-martial or before a proper civil tribunal, and in some cases
before both. * * * The jurisdiction which first attaches in any case is,
generally, entitled to proceed." Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
1951, p. 16. See also Lt. Comd. Griffin, "Trial by Civil or Military Courts,"
JAG J. 11. (July 1948).
B1Goodhart, op. tit. supra, note 59, at 762.
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directed is, as Professor Goodhart says, abuse of the civil rights
of civilians and subversion of the government by the military.
Giving the concept the status of a constitutional principle accents
the significance attached to it. The principle was, however,
formulated with reference to a state's own armed forces. It can
be argued it has no relevance to the status of visiting armed
forces. A majority of the Canadian Supreme Court, however,
held it applicable to visiting armed forces.52
62
"I have no doubt that this principle applies to all armies, British or
foreign, except in cases in which, as by the legislation mentioned dealing
with the American forces in England, it has been changed by legislative
enactment, or the equivalent thereof. There can be no doubt that in Great
Britain it is settled as indisputable that this is a principle of law applicable
in strict law to all armies there, except in so far as it has been modified
by statute.
$ $ $ $ * *
"I find it impossible to escape the conclusion that the United Kingdom has
never assented to any rule of international law by which British courts are
restricted in their jurisdiction in respect of visiting armies or members of
them. In other words, no such rule as that now insisted upon has ever been
a part of the law of England; and this applies equally to Canada. The
fundamental constitutional principle with which it is inconsistent is a part
of the law of every Province of Canada, the constitutional principle by
which, that is to say, a soldier does not, in virtue of his military character,
escape the jurisdiction of the civil courts of this country." Sir Lyman P.
Duff, C.J.C., in Reference re Exemption of U.S. Forces from Canadian
Criminal Law [1943] 4 D.L.R. 11, 16, 21.
Hudson, J., concurred in the opinion.
Rand, J., in a separate opinion, said
:
"There is no doubt that constitutional principle in England has for
several centuries maintained the supremacy of the civil law over the mili-
tary arm. If that principle meets the rule of immunity to foreign forces
arising in the circumstances stated, then the latter must give way. The
principle is intended to maintain a nation of free men through an equality
before the law and a common liability to answer to the same civil tribunals.
The citizen taking on the special duties of a soldier abates no jot of that
accountability. The independence of that law and its courts in the armed
forces would open the way to military domination and the loss of that
freedom which equality secures.
"Can that principle be said to be infringed by jurisdiction in a military
court of the United States over its own forces which for the purposes of
both countries are temporarily on our soil? It is, of course, not foreign but
domestic military usurpation against which the principle is a bastion and it
might strongly be argued that the objection to conceding such a jurisdiction
is not that it is military but that it is foreign. But I have come to the
conclusion that that principle stands in the way of implied exemption when
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Whether that judgment was correct or not, the fact that states
like the United States and Great Britain give their civil courts
concurrent jurisdiction over their own armed forces has some
bearing on the persuasiveness with which such a state can argue
that its armed forces must always be under the exclusive control
of their commander. A significant distinction in terms of control
exists between subjecting the members of a state's armed forces
to the jurisdiction of that state's civil courts and acquiescing in
the exercise of jurisdiction over them by the civil courts of a
foreign state. Yet the fact remains that a state whose armed
forces are subject to the jurisdiction of its civil courts cannot, as
a sending state, argue with complete impunity that military
necessity demands they be immune from the jurisdiction of
foreign civil courts. When in the position of a receiving state,
such a state is likely to be reluctant to accord immunity from
its jurisdiction to visiting forces.
Courts of a sending state are not only courts-martial ; they are,
by definition, foreign courts operating under a foreign system of
law. This runs counter to a principle, related to but broader than
the British constitutional principle referred to, and widely shared.
It is the belief that all those within the territory of the state
—
citizens or aliens, soldiers or civilians—should be answerable to
and be protected by the same courts administering the same
law. 53 Any departure, for any group, whether it gives them a
the act complained of clashes with civilian life. The question is what is the
workable rule implied from the invitation, that fits into the fundamental legal
and constitutional system to which it is offered. It is from the background
of that system that the invitation and its acceptance must be interpreted.
It cannot be said to be clear that there has been a recognition of either a
usage or principle by the Parliament or the courts of this country or of
Great Britian that would raise the immunity against the constitutional
safeguard of accountability before a common tribunal. That safeguard,
however, is concerned primarily to vindicate, not Canadian courts, but
Canadian civil liberty. It does not, therefore, stand in the way of a rule
limited to the relations of members of a foreign group admitted into Canada
for temporary national purposes with persons other than members of the
Canadian public: Cheung case (supra) and the memorandum of Sir Alex-
ander Cockburn in the Report of the Royal Commission on Fugitive Slaves
quoted therein." Id., at 49-50. Cf p. 128, infra, no. 43; p. 131, infra.
53 A guest editorial from The Times Weekly Edition, London, Aug. 5,
1942, in 28 A.B.A.J. 679, said: "For centuries it has been a fundamental
principle of English law that all charges relating to crime alleged to have
been committed within the realm, whatever the nationality or condition of
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more or less favored position, may be met with objections.54 The
depth of conviction with which the view of the objectors can be
the person accused, are matters for the determination of the King's courts
alone."
In the debate in the House of Commons on the Bill to implement the
NATO Agreement, Mr. Eric Fletcher said, 505 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.) 586
(1952) : "[M] embers of the visiting Forces and their civilian components
will be able to commit crimes which cannot be tried in the courts of this
country. That is something which, prima facie, shocks those who have been
brought up to respect the deep-seated constitutional principle of this land.
"* * * They will only be answerable for their crimes to the exclusive
jurisdiction of foreign service courts. There has not been anything like
that in this country since the Middle Ages, when a certain section of the
community could claim benefit of clergy, and when there was a certain Papal
jurisdiction which could defeat the claims of the English common law courts.
"[It] must be somewhat humiliating for those who have always believed
in the paramountcy of the British courts in trying and bringing to justice
any and every crime committed in this country."
Sir Frank Soskice, in a later debate, said: "From the point of view of the
ordinary person, that which is the most surprising and perhaps least pleas-
ing is the fact that an American citizen can, while in this country, commit
grave offences and, nevertheless, not be subject to the jurisdiction of our
own criminal courts. We are, by long tradition—as are most other
countries—used to the concept that our criminal courts have jurisdiction
over all offences committed within our territory * * *.
"They [inter se and on duty offences] include a very large number of
serious offences—murder, rape and that sort of thing. It shocks ordinary
persons and is, prima facie, surprising to them that our own criminal courts
should not be able to try all persons who, within the jurisdiction of those
courts, commit those offences." 526 H. C. Deb. (5th ser.) 1290 (1954).
64 "Exclusive criminal jurisdiction, amounting to extraterritoriality, itself
creates difficult problems. In the eyes of the local population, it sets Ameri-
cans apart as a special, privileged class, and this fact acts as a constant
irritant. If American courts-martial return verdicts of acquittal, or if
they impose sentences which seem lenient to the aggrieved parties, they are
open to charges of favoritism. If, on the other hand—as has sometimes
happened—they impose sentences substantially greater than those provided
by local law for the same crime, they can be accused of flouting local
customs and sensibilities. Regardless of how fair and just American courts-
martial may be, the existence of exclusive criminal jurisdiction seems to the
other country to be an infringement of its sovereignty." Letter of General
Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State, to Senator Wiley, 99 Cong.
Rec, 8777. (1953).
Two amendments to the Bill to implement the NATO Agreement were
discussed in the House of Commons, one to prohibit a sentence "not per-
mitted by the law of the United Kingdom" and the other "Provided always
that no one shall be punishable within the United Kingdom for an offence
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held and the vigor with which it can be expressed are shown in
the Ranollo case.55 Such view is the cornerstone supporting the
principle of territorial jurisdiction.
The preceding discussion suggests these general conclusions:
Military exigency requires that a state have jurisdiction to pre-
scribe rules with respect to the conduct of its armed forces
abroad, and also that it have enforcement jurisdiction in the re-
ceiving state. Exercise of such jurisdiction must not be subject
to any or, possibly, only the most limited supervisory jurisdiction
of the receiving state. All of this is essential if the commander
is to maintain that discipline which is required if the force is to
be effective in ensuring the security of the state. It is not, how-
ever, by any means clear that military exigency requires that the
sending state have exclusive jurisdiction over its forces. There
based upon racial discrimination." Neither was adopted. 505 H.C. Deb.
(5th ser.) 1122, 1126, 1145, 1146 (1952). The NATO Agreement, Art. 7(a),
provides: "A death sentence shall not be carried out in the receiving State
by the authorities of the sending State if the legislation of the receiving
State does not provide for such punishment in a similar case."
68 Westchester County v. Ranollo, 187 Misc. 777, 67 N.Y. Supp. 2d, 31
;
41 A.J.I.L. 690 (1947). In rejecting the argument that all personnel ac-
credited to the United Nations were immune, the court said: "To recognize
the existence of a general and unrestricted immunity from suit or prosecu-
tion on the part of the personnel of the United Nations, so long as the
individual be performing in his official capacity, even though the individual's
function has no relation to the importance or the success of the Organiza-
tion's deliberations, is carrying the principle of immunity completely out
of bounds. To establish such a principle would be in effect to create a large
preferred class within our borders who would be immune to punishment on
identical facts for which the average American would be subject to punish-
ment. Any such theory does violence to and is repugnant to the American
sense of fairness and justice and flouts the very basic principle of the United
Nations itself, which in its preamble to its Charter affirms that it is created
to give substance to the principle that 'the rights of all men and women are
equal.' * * * It is only by a proper distinction of the immunity to be ac-
corded to the personnel of the United Nations and by a proper circum-
scription of the effect to be given the Congressional language that the
American people can be assured that the hospitality accorded the United
Nations on American soil will not be abused by conduct on the part of
even the humblest of its personnel in a manner that is hostile to the Ameri-
can concept of the equal administration of justice among our people. This
Court feels strongly * * * that such immunity should be available only
when it is truly necessary to assure the proper deliberations of the
Organization * * *."
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is substance to the argument that a commander must have ex-
clusive control over the force, particularly now that modern
weapons and technology have made reaction time so short.
Against these considerations must be set the very real considera-
tions supporting the territorial principle and hence jurisdiction in
the receiving state. To these must be added the fact that any
exercise of jurisdiction by one state in the territory of another is
inevitably less than wholly effective because of certain inevitable
limitations, and account must be taken of considerations support-
ing civil jurisdiction over the military. A balance between oppos-
ing factors is not easy to strike, and the proper decision may well
vary with circumstances. In time of peace, however, the balance
appears to be on the side of concurrent jurisdiction in the re-
ceiving state.
It is quite clear, on the other hand, that the interests of mem-
bers of the armed forces, as individuals, are not a relevant con-
sideration. Immunities are accorded to protect the interests of
the state, not the individual. A member of a visiting armed force
is, like any citizen, entitled to the protection of the ordinary rules
of international law concerning the denial of justice, but not, as
an individual, to any further protection.
